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Abstract 
If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, then neither increasing 
the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in the illegal dumping of waste. 
The only policy that unambiguously decreases illegal dumping is lowering the price at legal dump 
sites because increasing the probability or severity triggers investment into a legal war chest to 
challenge the fine, while a decrease in the costs of legal dumping does not. If the regulator can 
only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, 
then strategic commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in the legal war 
chest, an increased fraction of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the 
nonstrategic case. 
Four out of every five decisions I make are contested in court. 
I. Introduction 
--William K. Reilly 
Administrator, US EPA 
The enforcement of environmental regulations has been examined in a variety of different 
contexts. In the case of perfectly enforceable constraints, the conventional rule is that the profit 
maximizing firm will employ pollution control until the margin benefit equals the marginal cost of 
resultant fines. Even under imperfect enforcement, this simple rule is not significantly altered 
unless the fine on pollution is partially avoided [see for example Harford (1978), Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser (1979), and Lee (1984)]. 
We relax two assumptions common to this literature. First, we relax the assumption that a 
firm does not challenge the enforcement of an environmental regulation. The firm no longer 
passively allows the regulator to impose a fine or penalty. As Kambhu (1990) points out, a firm is 
actually quite active.' While the regulator attempts to impose a fine, a firm can invest significant 
resources in a legal war chest to contest the action. Firm response to the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) attempt to implement Superfund is a good example.' Rich (1985) 
argues that firms will spend more than $8 billion in litigation costs contesting the EPA's efforts to 
fine disposal of hazardous wastes, 79 percent to be paid by private parties. Yandle ( 1988) 
contends that eliminating these costs would free enough resources to clean more than 400 
additional Superfund sites. Significant resources are being devoted to challenge the enforcement 
of the environmental regulator.' 
Second, we relax the presumption that the regulatory agency only confronts one firm. An 
additional complication stems from recognizing that multiple firms are regulated and that 
monitoring by the agency is imperfect. Often the regulatory agency cannot perfectly distinguish 
2 
the illegal waste disposal activities of one firm from another. In this case, a firm that has been 
accused by a regulatory agency as having violated a standard has additional incentive to question 
the fine by identifying other firms who may also be responsible for the violation. 
This paper examines the efficacy of regulating illegal dumping of hazardous waste if the firm 
can challenge the enforcement of the regulation. Using a simple cost minimization model, we 
demonstrate that neither the traditional tactics of increasing the probability nor the severity of a 
fine will guarantee a reduction in illegal dumping. The policy that unambiguously reduces illegal 
dumping is to lower the cost of legal dumping because both monitoring and the fine trigger 
investments to challenge the regulator, thereby providing more incentive to increase the fraction 
of illegal dumping. Lowering the costs of legal dumping, however, does not provide the same 
incentive. Additionally, when the regulator cannot perfectly monitor the source of pollution we 
also show that a firm's strategic commitment to a legal war chest for fighting off accusations made 
by the regulator or other firms increases overall illegal waste disposal by both firms. Now the 
firm reacts to both the regulator and the other firm, increasing the incentive to invest more to 
challenge enforcement. This induces the firm to further increase the fraction of illegal dumping. 
These results suggest that optimal enforcement strategies should account for the interplay between 
enforcement and the firm's defense investments. 
2. A Model of Illegal Dumping 
Beginning with the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, regulators have been concerned about 
the disposal of hazardous material. Fears of illegal "midnight" dumping have prompted 
policymakers to enact a common monitoring and enforcement scheme.• Following Linder and 
McBride (1984), assume a fine, F, for illegal dumping is set by a national agency with the 
responsibility of enforcement left to the local agency. The local agency's goal is to use their 
budget efficiently to correctly identify any violations of the law [Crocker (1984)]. Reflecting 
current thinking, Russell (1990) argues that to ensure high rates of compliance. firms must face 
"very high expected penalties" (p. 274). 
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Assume the local agency takes the firm's expenditures to avoid detection as given and chooses 
a level of enforcement, m, to apprehend all illegal dumpers.' The local authority tries to 
apprehend and convict the firm whenever illegal dumping is detected, while the firm expends 
resources, k, attempting to avoid detection or to contest any potential fine. Let w denote the unit 
cost to challenge the environmental authority. The probability, p(m,o:,k) that the local agency will 
detect any illegal dumping and successfully impose a fine is positively related to their monitoring 
efforts and the firm's fraction of illegal dumping, o: (0 :5o: :5 1), in which the firm engages, and is 
inversely related to the firm's ability to challenge enforcement Pm > 0, p"' > 0, and p, < 0. 
Subscripts denote relevant partial derivatives. 
The firm's cost of illegal disposal is composed of two parts. First, the firm has a cost, z, of 
illegal disposal even if not detected. Second, the firm's expected fine, p(·)F, is an additional cost 
of operation. Write the expected costs of illegal disposal 
a[(l-p(m,a,k))z+p(m,a,k)(z+F) +wk]. 
Assume the remaining fraction of waste (1 - o:) is legally disposed at a government-approved 
waste site at a per unit cost L. 
(l) 
The representative risk neutral firm's problem is to minimize costs by selecting how much 
waste to dump illegally, o:, and how much effort to expend challenging enforcement, k, to reduce 
the probability of a fine 
Min ((1- a]L + a((l- p(·)]z + p(·) (z +F) + wk]. 
Assume Nash behavior such that Bm/Bk = Bk/Bm = 0. First-order conditions for an interior 
solution are 
a: z + p ( ·) F + a.p.F = L 
k: a.p~ + w = 0. 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
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Second-order conditions are assumed to hold whenever (3) and (4) hold: 
D ~ F' [ (2p. + <IP •• ) <tp._.- (pk + <tp.k)'J > 0, 
F(2p. + «p .. ) > a, and a.p._.F > a, 
Equation (3) marks the conventional result that the firm will equate the marginal expected cost of 
illegal dumping to the known cost of legal disposal. Equation ( 4) states that the firm will attempt 
to question the authority of the regulator until its marginal productivity equals its cost. We now 
consider how changes in the regulator's three policy tools (m,F,L) will affect the firm's optimal 
level of illegal dumping, ex'. 
3. Illegal Dumping with and without Challenging Enforcement (Perfect Monitoring) 
We examine the comparative statics for illegal dumping to illustrate the impact of the firm 
contesting the rules of the regulator attempting to impose a fine on illegal dumping. We 
assume perfect monitoring: the regulator can always assign the fine to the firm who dumps 
illegally. Since the regulator has only one firm to contend with, this is reasonable. First, consider 
the traditional baseline case where the firm's contesting expenditures are fixed, k = k0 , [e.g., 
Lawyer (1986)]. The following proposition summarizes the comparative static results for the 
baseline case. 
Proposition 1: If the firm's ability to challenge enforcement is exogenous, then a reduction in 
illegal dumping of hazardous waste is guaranteed if the regulator increases the fine, increases the 
probability of detection, or reduces the cost of legal dumping: 
a"·;aF = - <P • "P.l 1 F(2p. • "P .. l < a (5) 
(6) 
aa.·;aL = 1/F(2p. + a.p .. l >a. (7) 
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Three appealing, but predictable, results emerge from Proposition I. If the regulator increases 
either the probability or the severity of the fine, or if the costs of legal dumping are reduced, then 
the firm will decrease its illegal dumping [also see Becker and Stigler (1974)). 
Now let the firm expend resources on a legal war chest to reduce the probability of being 
fined. We can now demonstrate that an increase in the expected penalty is insufficient to 
guarantee a reduction in illegal dumping. Relaxing the presumption that k = k', Proposition 2 
summarizes the comparative static results. 
Proposition 2: If the firm's ability to challenge enforcement is endogenous, then a reduction in 
illegal dumping can only be guaranteed by a reduction in the cost of legal dumping. Increasing 
the fine or probability of detection could result in increased illegal dumping. 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
If the ability to contest a regulation is endogenous, increasing the probability and the severity 
of a fine have ambiguous impacts on the firm's level of illegal dumping. Increasing the severity 
of the fine is ambiguous if the first bracketed term on the right hand side of (8) is positive due to 
second-order conditions, while the second term is negative if p"'' < 0, the most realistic 
assumption. There is a countervailing impact between the direct effect ofF on the firm and the 
indirect effect ofF on the investment to challenge the regulator. The direct effect gives incentive 
to reduce illegal dumping, but the indirect effect gives incentive to increase the investment to 
challenge, thereby increasing the function of illegal dumping. Which effect dominates is 
unknown. 
Increasing the probability through increased m is also ambiguous since, although the first 
bracketed term in (9) is positive if p"'m ~ 0, the sign of the second term is unknown. The sign 
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depends on how the firm's expenditures on k affect the marginal productivity of the regulator's 
efforts to increase the probability, Ptm· If the k decreases the marginal productivity of the 
regulator (p.,. < 0), then the second term is negative, thereby having a countervailing indirect 
impact on the first term. Again there are countervailing direct and indirect effects. The firm 
may then actually increase its proportion of illegal dumping if there is an increase in the 
probability or severity of the fine. We cannot support the argument that an increase in expected 
penalties will automatically result in reduced illegal dumping.' 
Proposition 2 sugg,ests that the policy that still has an unambiguously negative impact on 
illegal dumping is decreasing the ~osts of legal dumping. This result occurs because changing the 
cost of legal disposal does not affect the firm's contribution to the legal war chest. Consequently, 
there is no indirect incentive to increase illegal dumping because more resources are being used to 
challenge authority. This result softens Kamhbu's (1990) argument that a command system may 
be preferred if the ability to challenge enforcement exists, since we find that the incentive-based 
policy is still a powerful tool. The incentive is compatible in that it supports both the goal of the 
regulator-reduced illegal dumping and the goal of the firm-reduced costs.' 
4. Illegal Dumping with Imperfect Monitoring 
An important consideration in this analysis is the agency's absolute ability to monitor the 
firm's illegal dumping. An immediate question is what happens if more than one firm exists, and 
the agency cannot perfectly distinguish between the illegal dumping of one firm and that of 
another? In the case of agrichemical contamination of groundwater, the regulator may have 
difficulty determining the nonpoint source of the pollutant [see Segerson (1990); Shogren and 
Crocker (1991)]. The firm's probability of being fined is now a function of its illegal dumping 
and the illegal dumping of all other firms, p, = p, (cx1,cx2, ••• cx., ... cx,;k,,m). 
The potential fine faced by any firm is transferable. If firm I is accused of violating a 
standard, firm I may in turn accuse firm 2 in hopes of avoiding part or all of the fine. Evidence 
of this type of behavior is noted by a recent article in the Wall Street Journal (April 2, 1991) 
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describing a Utica, New York court case. 'Filing the federal-court suit were two big corporations 
that, themselves accused of violating antipollution statutes had agreed to commence a $9 million 
cleanup of [a]landfill. And they were trying to squeeze $5 million of that cost from hundreds of 
Utica-area towns, school districts and small-business owners' [p. 1]. 
There is an interdependence between firms creating an environmental conflict. As in most 
conflicts, the firms may appeal to some form of strategic commitment to lower the risk of 
financial liability [see Dixit (1987)]. In our case, the firm can contribute strategically to the legal 
war chest, k, which can be used to contest enforcement of the regulation and to fend off the 
accusations of other firms. 
To examine the impact of strategic commitment to a legal war chest, we introduce a second 
firm. Let the probability of firm 1 being fined now be written as 
(ll) 
where we assume 
implying P~ is strictly positive and decreasing in k. Assume symmetric firms such that similar 
conditions hold for firm 2. Note that we withhold the government's monitoring expenditures, m, 
from (11) for notational convenience. 
Following Brandon and Spencer (1983), consider a two-stage game where the firms first 
contribute to the war chest and then make their decision on what fraction of waste to dump 
illegally. To solve use backward induction, where the firms select the level of dumping to 
minimize costs 
Min c' 
., 
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For simplicity assume that, except for the potential fine, there are zero costs of illegal dumping, z 
z = 0. Given (ll) and z = 0, the first- and second-order conditions for an interior solution for 
firm i are 
( 12) 
1 1 1 C11 • 2P1 F + a 1P11 F > 0. 
Equation (!2) represents the implicit illegal dumping reaction function for firm i. Except for the 
more detailed probability function and z = 0, equation (!2) is identical to (3). Note that the 
solution to (!2) now depends on k1 and k2 such that 
The slope of the implicit reaction function is determined by totally differentiating (!2) 
1 1 l I 1 (pi + ctiPiJ F Cii < 0 (i~j), ( l3) 
since by assumption of pj > 0 and P:; > 0 implying "'; increases both the total and marginal 
expectations of being fined for illegal dumping. Using these restrictions, to guarantee the 
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium given the firm's reaction functions, we assume the 
firm's own effects of illegal dumping on marginal costs exceed the cross effects of illegal 
dumping, 
( 14) 
Under the new structure, consider the strategic commitment to the war chest. Firm i 
selects k1 to minimize 
M1~ q 1 • [1- a 1 (k1 ,k2 )] L + a 1 (k1 ,k2 )p 1 (a 1 (k1'k2 ) ,a2 (k1 ,k2 ), k 1)F + wk1 , (15) 
' 
yielding the following first-order condition: 
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From the first-order condition (12) we know the first term in brackets equals zero, implying 
(16) 
From (4) we know cost is minimized when ex1 p~ F + w = 0. Therefore, to determine how 
investment is affected by strategic commitment we must sign the term (ilex;filkj. Differentiate 
(12) with respect to ex 1, ex2, and k1, to obtain the following system of simultaneous equations: 
where 
Now apply Cramer's Rule to obtain 
da 1 
dk, 
since 8 > 0 from condition (14). This now implies from equation (16) th 
(17) 
(18) 
( 19) 
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(20) 
since (do:,/dk1) < 0 and (do:,/dk1) = (do:/dk,) by symmetry. Equation (20) implies that you are 
actually overinvesting in the war chest. 
From this structure we can now compare the behavior of the firm in the strategic case [e.g. 
(15)] to the nonstrategic case (Nash) described by (2). The following proposition summarizes the 
results. 
Proposition 3: Relative to the Nash equilibrium, strategic commitment to challenge a regulation 
leads to (a) overinvestment in the legal war chest; (b) an increased fraction of illegal dumping by 
both firms; and (c) an increase in total costs. 
The implication of Proposition 3 is that when there is a chance the regulator will falsely 
accuse a firm of another firm's illegal dumping, the firm has even more incentive to protect 
themselves. The firm who strategically commits to the war chest will overinvest relative to the 
Nash case since it now recognizes the interdependence between firms. Firm l notes that firm 2 
also has a similar incentive to challenge the regulator for bath justified and unjustified claims. 
The question of liability must be established, but with imperfect detection both firms must protect 
themselves from both their own and the other firm's illegal dumping. 
Overinvestment in a legal war chest lowers the probability of paying a fine, which prompts 
the firm to feel safer in disposing of a larger fraction of wastes illegally. We say nothing about 
the absolute level of illegal dumping, but only consider the fraction of waste dumped illegally. To 
determine total waste we would need to introduce another choice variable, output, into the 
analysis. If the firm reduced total output by more than it increases the fraction of illegal 
dumping, then the total pollution level would actually decrease. We leave the formalities for 
future research. 
Proof: The proof of Proposition 3 follows directly from Brander and Spencer ( 1983). To prove 
part (a), apply the mean value theorem 
II 
!J.g • g(k') - g(k"l = Vg(k) (k'-k"l, 
where 'i7g(k) is the gradient of g evaluated at k and k = k' + ,B(k' - k") for some ,8E(0, I). 
Let k" = (k~, k~) be the Nash war chest, k' = (k;, k;) be the strategic war chest, 
.C.k1 = k; - k~, and .c.q: = q: (k') - q: (k"). Note that then .C.q\ = q\1 .C.k, + q\2 .C.k, and 
(21) 
(22) 
where q> = qi, q\1 - ql, q\2 > 0 by the assumption that own effects dominate cross effects. From 
(21) and (22), 
(23) 
where qi,- qi, > 0 and q\1 - q\2 > 0 by own terms again dominating cross terms. To sign (23) we 
need to sign .c.q:. Note that .c.q: = q;(k')- q:(k"). Since q;(k') = 0 from (16) and q:(k') = o:,pj 
(ao:;fak;) F < 0 from (4), (16), and (19) then .c.q: > 0. Therefore, from equation (23), .C.k, + .C.k2 > 
0, implying that firms overinvest in effort, given strategic behavior relative to Nash behavior. 
To prove part (b), note that since o:1 = o:1(k1, k,) and o:, = o:2(k1, k,), then 
aal aal 
!J. al = ak !J.kl + • !J.k,. 
t ck'l 
By symmetry .C.k, = .C.k2 = .C.k, and 
therefore, 
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From (18) and (19), 
(24) 
Equation (24) is positive since own effects dominate cross effects. This implies that the fraction 
of illegal dumping by both firms increases with strategic commitment. 
To prove part (c) note that t.q' = q: t.k, + ql t.k; = (q: + qj) t.k by symmetry, and from (16) 
and 
(25) 
where the second term on the right hand side of (25) equals zero from (12). Therefore, 
(26) 
from (20) and (24 ), and since t.k = t.k, + t.k, > 0 then equation (26) implies total costs increase 
with strategic commitment relative to Nash. 
Q.E.D 
The comparative static results of changes in the regulatory tools remain qualitatively 
unchanged. At higher levels of monitoring, m, there is a direct impact that decreases the fraction 
of illegal dumping, but an indirect impact that increases the legal war chest, thereby increasing 
the fraction of illegal dumping. We do not know whether the direct or indirect effect dominates. 
A similar result holds for a higher value of the fine, F. Again, the direct and indirect effects have 
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countervailing incentives. The only unambiguous result is that as the cost of legal dumping 
decreases, L, then the equilibrium results in less illegal dumping. This follows because there is no 
indirect effect on the war chest. Reducing L does not provide any incentive to challenge the 
authority of the environmental regulator. 
5. Conclusion 
A firm's ability to challenge the enforcement power of a regulator plays a major role in the 
efficacy of environmental regulation. Given perfect monitoring, simply increasing the expected 
value of a fine or penalty is insufficient to guarantee a decrease in illegal dumping of hazardous 
waste if the firm's ability to contest the regulation is endogenous. A policy of decreasing the 
price at legal dump sites resulted in the only unambiguous decrease in illegal dumping. In 
addition, we consider when the regulator cannot perfectly monitor illegal action, such that he 
cannot distinguish between the actions of one firm from another. In this case, if the firms 
strategically commit to their legal war chests, then relative to the Nash case they overinvest in 
effort to challenge authority, increase the fraction of illegal activity, and increase their overall 
cost. Given our results, a relevant query is, how does the ability to challenge enforcement have an 
impact on the effectiveness of other forms of regulatory action such as taxes or tradable permits. 
We unavoidably leave this for future exploration. Regardless of the action, however, our results 
support the recent effort of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, which is attempting to use 
negotiations to preempt suits on regulations, thereby potentially reducing the social costs of 
environmental conflicts. 
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Endnotes 
I. Kambhu (1990) demonstrates that when firms contest environmental regulations it may be 
more socially beneficial to use a command and control approach rather than an incentive-
based regulation. 
2. See Dower ( 1990) for more details on Superfund. Also see Tie ten berg (1989). 
3. William Reilly, administrator of U.S. EPA notes that "[w]e spend as much time designing our 
rules to withstand court attack as we do getting the rules right and out in the first place. • See 
Reilly (1991 ). 
4. See Copeland (1991) for a discussion of illegal dumping in the context of international trade 
of waste materials. He finds incentives to dump illegally in international waters given 
unilateral policy restrictions of the trade of waste. 
5. Magat and Viscusi (1991) provide a detailed description of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency's monitoring and enforcement procedure in the pulp and paper industry. They note 
that firms do engage in protracted haggling with the agency that has led to prolonged 
litigation. 
6. The assumption that p"'m 2:. 0 implies that the marginal impact of being fined due to increased 
illegal dumping does not decrease with increased monitoring. 
7. Malik (I 990) also demonstrates that if an offender invests resources to reduce the probability 
of a fine, then it is suboptimal to set the fine as high as possible. He finds that the ability to 
screen an individual is critical in selecting the optimal level of the fine. Screening can range 
from simple questions to using a lie detector in court. 
8. Note that in most cases of hazardous waste the regulator still controls entry into the market. 
Therefore, an incentive-based system of subsidizing legal disposal coupled with controlled 
entry could decrease illegal disposal of hazardous waste. 
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